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Introduction

One of the happier ironies of recent labor history can be
found in the impetus given union democracy by the Landrum-Griffin Act. At the time the Act was passed, the thinking of disinterested observers had not yet crystallized on the
merits of running a union's affairs democratically. 1 It is
probably fair to say that the main push in Congress for
I. In 1959, the year Landrum-Griffin was enacted, a number of American

and English authorities could be cited in support of the thesis that
"democracy is as inappropriate within the international headquarters
of the UAW as it is in the front office of General Motors." See Magrath,
"Democracy in Overalls: The Futile Quest for Union Democracy," 12
Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 503, 525 (1959) . But the current trend of opinion
is clearly the other way. See, e.g., Lipset et al., Union Democracy 448-63
(1956, 1962); Leiserson, American Trade Union Democracy 53-82 (1959);
Cox, "Internal Affairs of Labor Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of
1959," 58 Mich. L. Rev. 819, 830 (1960); Summers, "The Impact of
Landrum-Griffin in State Courts," 13 N.Y.U. Ann. Conf. on Labor 333, 335
(1960).
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Landrum-Griffin and, particularly, its Title, "Bill of Rights"
came from a conservative coalition which was less concerned
with promoting the individual rights of working people than
with blunting the effectiveness of labor organizations. 2
There is hardly anything unique in such a situation; the
purification of any well-established institution is likely to
require a sizable (if unwitting) contribution by its enemies.
Yet I suspect that today most commentators would agree the
foes of unionism in the 1959 Congress performed their role
in especially commendable style. By and large, the provisions of the Landrum-Griffin Act dealing with internal union
affairs have significantly advanced the cause of union democracy while doing little if any damage to the structure of organized labor. 3
Having sketched this rather idyllic picture, I almost hesitate to inject the serpent into the scene by stirring up old
questions about the prop.er function of law in securing democratic procedures within labor unions. But I feel I must.
For I believe that in the laudable pursuit of individual membership rights, the Labor Department and the courts have
occasionally trampled upon other democratic values of an
even higher order. And, if some academic critics had their
way the process would be carried still further.
The past year has not been rich in landmark decisions on
Landrum-Griffin. This, then, would seem an opportune time
to pause for a brief reexamination of a few basic premises
of national policy regarding internal union affairs. Such
a reexamination should also serve to add perspective to my
subsequent discussion of the major developments under
Landrum-Griffin during the last twelve months.
2. See, e.g., Dunau, "Some Comments on the Bill of Rights of Members of
Labor Organizations," 14 N.Y.U. Ann. Conf. on Labor 77-8 (1961); Cox,
supra note 1, at 820-21, 831-33. Cf, Taft, "Reflections on the Present State
of the Labor Movement," IRRA, Proceedings 14th Ann. Meeting 2, 6-7
(1961).
3. I have argued elsewhere that Landrum-Griffin's Title VII amendments
to Taft-Hartley tipped the scales too far against the use of union economic power vis-a-vis management. See St. Antoine, "Secondary Boycotts
and Hot Cargo: A Study in Balance of Power," 40 Det. L.]. 189 (1962).
But this is not the place to resume that debate.

LANDRUM-GRIFFIN-1965-1966

37

THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN SECURING
UNION DEMOCRACY
What role should government play in promoting democracy within labor organizations? Obviously, there can never
be a definitive answer to a query such as that. But I think
some helpful insights can be gained by breaking the issue
down into three subsidiary questions: To what extent is it
desirable for unions to be operated democratically? To what
extent should union democracy be imposed and enforced
from outside? And who is to answer those two questions, insofar as they are to be answered as a matter of federal law?
Democracy as a Goal

It would be easy to say that unions should be "completely"
democratic. Even today, however, that statement probably
needs a good bit of qualification in order to command general assent. Unions are not merely debating societies. They
are militant organizations that must act quickly and decisively in times of crisis. I doubt that any real friend of the
working man would insist that every union decision must be
argued out and voted upon in town-meeting fashion. At the
same time, both management and the public arguably stand
to suffer from irresponsibility in collective bargaining which
is a possible side effect of a massive injection of democracy
into labor organizations.
Fair elections of officers are the mainsprings of union democracy. Yet, here too, there is a difference between the
desirability of preventing the ballot box from being stuffed
and the desirability of opening candidacies to every member,
regardless of his experience or lack of experience in union
affairs. I would resolve most doubts in favor of facilitating
genuine contests for union office. But I think it must be
conceded that, as union elections come to be more and more
like two-party races for state governor and less and less like
stockholders' ratifications of corporate directorships, the
greater will be the danger that able young men may be de-
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terred from aiming for careers as union leaders. Certainly
it is understandable why several perceptive observers of the
labor scene have expressed fears, for a variety of reasons, that
union democracy might carry too high a price tag. 4 At any
rate, this clearly seems an issue over which the most reasonable of men could differ, especially as of 1959.
Democracy and the Law

Assuming we set aside the qualms of the faint-hearted (or
hard-headed, as you will) and opt for union democracy in
some degree or another, how are we to secure it? In this day
and age, one response can be expected almost as a reflex
action-through federal law. The suggestion has much to
recommend it. Inertia or worse may stall union efforts at
self-reform. 5 While state common law courts can usually
enforce membership rights spelled out in an organization's
constitution, they are hard put to write minimum guarantees from scratch. 6 Federal regulation can ensure that at
least certain minimal standards will be observed by all
unions. On the other hand, government intervention inevitably poses something of a threat to healthy union selfrule.7 Moreover, the uniformity which law naturally tends
to produce may impair an organization's ability to tailor its
internal processes to its own peculiar needs. So, on the means
of achieving union democracy, as on the merits of the end
itself, reasonable men have differed.
Regulation and Governmental Restraint

I take it all would agree, in principle, that the place of
federal law in this field must basically be determined by
4. See, e.g., Dunlop, quoted in Cox, supra note I, at 829-30; Taft, supra
note 2, at 7; Magrath, supra note I, at 523-25, citing various authorities.
5. Cf. Kerr, Unions and Union Leaders of Their Own Choosing 5 (1958);
Cox, "The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy," 72 Harv. L. Rev.
609, 610 (1959) .
6. Cox, supra note 1, at 843; Summers, supra note 1, at 344-46.
7. Cf. S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 7 (1959); Cox, supra note 1,
at 831, 845.
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Congress. I am not so sure everyone is prepared to accept
the implications of that principle. Justice Frankfurter once
noted, in construing Taft-Hartley, that the Act was "to a
marked degree, the result of conflict and compromise between strong contending forces and deeply held views," and
he drew from this a counsel of "wariness in finding by construction a broad policy against [certain union conduct]
when, from the words of the statute itself, it is clear that
those interested in just such a condemnation were unable
to secure its embodiment in enacted law." 8 The same can
be said of Landrum-Griffin. It too was the product of "strong
contending forces." Much more than now, there were
"deeply held views" on the merits and demerits of union
democracy, and on the merits and demerits of enforcing it
through federal law. The statute that was hammered out
was of the essence of compromise. I therefore find it vaguely
disquieting to see the best of scholars decrying a "narrow
and niggardly judicial approach" to the Act, and urging
detours around its "awkward wording." 9 I'm inclined to
interpret these statements, perhaps uncharitably, as pleas
that the statute be applied more in accord with the heart's
desires of the commentators than in accord with the legislative mandate.
While I do not wish unduly to dramatize the situation, it
seems to me that an overeagerness to expand the scope of
Landrum-Griffin, however well-intentioned, represents at
least a small betrayal of a democratic value that far transcends
union democracy in importance. I would hold with Justice
Cardozo:
When the legislature has spoken, and declared one interest
superior to another, the judge must subordinate his personal
or subjective estimate of value to the estimate thus declared.
8. Carpenters Local 1976 v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 99-100 (1958).
9. See Aaron, "The Union Member's 'Bill of Rights': First Two Years,"
Industrial Relations (February 1962) 47, 70; Summers, "Pre-emption
and the Labor Reform Act-Dual Rights and Remedies," 22 Ohio State
L.J. 119, 136, 138, n. 89 (1961).
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He may not nullify or pervert a statute because convinced
that an erroneous axiology is reflected in its terms. 10

Is it unrealistic to talk of the "legislature speaking" or of
"legislative purpose"? I think not. Naturally, when a statute
says something is to be done "reasonably" or "fairly," it is
foolish to contend that Congress has done more than deputize
the courts to legislate meaning into those protean terms. But
when the statute deals with whole areas of jurisdiction or
procedure as when it says, for example, that one type of right
shall be vindicated by private suit and another type by administrative action, 11 or when it says a union member must
first pursue intra-union remedies before seeking legal relief, 12 I believe a definite congressional judgment has been
expressed and a judge's or administrator's personal notions
must yield.
In addition, there may be more general guidelines which
must be honored. In reporting out the Kennedy bill, the
Senate Labor Committee emphasized the "desirability of
minimum interference by Government in the internal affairs
of any private organization," and cautioned that "in establishing and enforcing statutory standards great care should be
taken not to undermine union self-government." 13 This
philosophy was somewhat diluted when the original McClellan "Bill of Rights," sponsored by persons who doubtlessly did not share the Committee's concern about union
autonomy, was added on the Senate floor. 14 But, thereafter,
10. Cardozo, The Growth of the Law 94-5 (1924). To anyone who thinks
that an appeal to legislative purpose is passe in a time of free-wheeling
judicial policy determinations, I suggest perusal of Sinclair Ref. Co. v.
Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195 (1962), and Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134
(1964). Some of the more celebrated torturings of legislative intent by
the Supreme Court in recent years are probably attributable to lurking
constitutional questions. See, e.g., Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740
(1961); NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760,377 U.S. 58 (1964).
11. See discussion of Calhoon v. Harvey and related cases, infra, nn. 17-19 and
accompanying text.
12. See discussion of the Operating F,ng'rs. Local 9 and Operating Eng'rs.
Local 406 cases, infra; notes 62 8c 63 and accompanying text.
13. S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st sess. 7 (1959).
14. For an account by a close observer, see Cox, supra note 1, at 831-33.

LANDRUM-GRIFFIN-1965-1966

41

moderate forces under the leadership of Senator Kuchel
worked out a compromise substitute that replaced Senator
McClellan's rather vague and sweeping guarantees with a
series of "specifically enumerated rights," and reasserted a
union's authority to impose "reasonable" qualifications on
membership rights. 15 So even in the "Bill of Rights" the
principle of limited encroachment on union autonomy was
largely respected. No general commission was issued to the
courts to "go and do justice!"
I have painted with a broad brush long enough. It is time
to get down to specific cases. 16 As in previous years, Title I
("Bill of Rights") and Title IV (Elections) were the principal storm centers of Landrum-Griffin litigation in 19651966 and my survey will focus on these two areas. I will also
briefly mention some significant developments regarding the
anti-Communist ban, Labor Department investigations,
bonding requirements, and the duty of attorneys to report
under the Act.

TITLE I
Jurisdiction

The relationship of the "Bill of Rights" (enforceable by
private suit) to Landrum-Griffin's elections provisions (enforceable by the Secretary of Labor) , to state law and to
Taft-Hartley continues to trouble the courts. As could be
expected, a more restricted reading of Title I's scope has
followed in the wake of the 1964 decision in Calhoon v.

15. 105 Cong. Rec. 6717-26 (1959); H. Rep. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st sess.
95 (1959).
16. It is only fair to note that before donning the academic toga, I participated, directly or indirectly, as union counsel in several of the cases I am
to discuss. I do not think my association has greatly colored my judgment. Some of the union positions I will endorse; some I will reject; and
some find me unable to form any firm opinion.
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Harvey. 17 There, you will recall, the Supreme Court held
that the disqualification of a candidate presents issues to be
decided only under Title IV's eligibility standards and not
under Title I's guarantee of an equal right to nominate even
when a union uses a self-nomination procedure. District
courts have since held that Title IV rather than Title I governs a local's procedure for nominating delegates to an international convention 18 and an international's voiding of a
local election. 19 But Title I jurisdiction has been sustained
where "associate members" were allegedly denied the "equal
right" to vote and nominate candidates even though the relief requested included the setting aside of elections already
conducted, a remedy within the exclusive domain of Title
IV. 20 The court explained that at least some relief would be
available under Title I.
Title I jurisdiction depends upon the claimed violation of
one or more of a limited set of specified rights. Nonetheless,
the Second Circuit last year upheld a federal court preelection action to enforce a union's constitution (apparently
deemed a contract under state law) on the theory of "pendent
jurisdiction" after the intervening decision in Calhoon v.
Harvey destroyed the original Title I basis of the suit. 21 This
ruling seems sui generis, not to be applicable where a federal
claim under Title I is plainly nonexistent at the time suit is
brought. 22 On an issue which the Supreme Court must
eventually resolve, the Sixth Circuit and the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held (correctly, I believe) that a claim of discrimination in employment because of ouster from union
17. 379 U.S. 134 (1964). This apparently is a case which there's no use
arguing about. Everyone sees immediately that it's clearly right or
clearly wrong. I think it's clearly right. Last year's commentator went
the other way. Murphy, "Major Developments of the Year Under the
Landrum-Griffin Act," 18 N.Y.U. Ann. Con/. on Labor (1966).
18. Paravate v. Insurance Workers Local 13, 59 LRRM 2169 (W.D.Pa. 1965).
19. Carpenters Local 115 v. Carpenters, 247 F. Supp. 660, 60 LRRM 2518
(D. Conn. 1965).
20. O'Brien v. Paddock, 246 F. Supp. 809, 61 LRRM 2429 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
21. Libutti v. DiBrizzi, 343 F.2d 460, 58 LRRM 2846 (2d Cir. 1965).
22. See Wittstein v. Musicians, 59 LRRM 2335 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); McArthy v.
Machinists Lodge 9, 61 LRRM 2652 (E.D. Mo. 1966).
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membership is subject to exclusive NLRB jurisdiction, and
may not be the ground of a Landrum-Griffin action. 23

Substantive Rights

Equal Rights
Substantive interpretations of the "Bill of Rights" during
the past year were largely refinements of previously established principles. Again emphasized was the limitation of
Section 101 (a) (1) 's "equal rights" protection to the specifically listed guarantees of voting, nominating candidates
and so on. Thus, a union was held not guilty of contempt in
refusing to accept transfers of membership from a sister local
despite a court order requiring it to accord transferees "equal
rights." 24 And, absent voting discrimination, the reasonableness of convention procedure for passing a resolution was
held not subject to general review under Section 101 (a)(1).25 But union members were declared entitled to vote on
the ratification of a union contract if the question is properly
before a membership meeting. 26

Free Speech
The courts reaffirmed that the "free speech" guarantees in
Section 101 (a) (2) prevent union penalties even for false or
libelous statements about fellow members or union officials. 27
23. Knox v. UAW, 351 F.2d 72, 60 LRRM 2253 (6th Cir. 1965); Spica v.
ILG WU, 61 LRRM 2649 (Pa. 1966). But cf. Figueroa v. NMU, 342 F.2d
400, 58 LRRM 2619 (2d Cir. 1965). See also Arlook, "Federal Preemption
and Landrum-Griffin," 13 N.Y.U. Ann. Conf. on Labor 89 (1960).
24. Ferger v. lron Workers Local 483, 356 F.2d 854, 61 LRRM 2244 (3d Cir.
1966).
25. Wittstein v. Musicians, supra note 22. See also Hurwitz v. Directors Guild,
60 LRRM 2359 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (anti-Communist oath as reasonable
condition of continued membership), Rev'd 62 LRRM 2653 (2d Cir.
1966).
26. See Arnold v. Meat Cutters Local 653A, 60 LRRM 2013 (D. Minn. 1965).
27. Boilermakers v. Rafferty, 348 F.2d 307, 59 LRRM 2821 (9th Cir. 1965).
Cf. Farowitz v. Musicians Local 802, 241 F. Supp. 895, 59 LRRM 2749
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
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A member making statements discreditable to his union,
however, may possibly be subject to discipline for violating
his responsibility "toward the organization as an institution."28 Union officers, incidentally, may rely on the "free
speech" provision to protect their status not only as members
but also as officers. 29

Dues and Assessments
In accord with Supreme Court philosophy, 30 the courts
have exhibited a liberal attitude in upholding the validity
under Section 101 (a) (3) of union financial exactions. For
example, a local labor organization was lawfully obliged to
pay dues to a union coordinating body,-which the international executive board had compelled the local to join-,
once the statutory requirement of approval of the dues levy
by a "convention" of the coordinating body was fulfilled. 31
A musicians' engagement tax, authorized by a local's bylaws,
was upheld against an attack claiming it constituted an
"assessment" imposed without a membership vote. 32 And
the "reasonable notice" requirement of the statute, applicable when local dues are increased at a membership meeting, was found inapplicable when an increase was voted on
through a referendum. 33

Hearing Procedures
The year's trail-blazing "Bill of Rights" litigation involved
Section IOI (a) (4), which provides that "[n]o labor organization shall limit the right of any member" to institute
judicial or administrative proceedings. A proviso states that
28. Deacon v. Operating Eng'rs Local 12, 59 LRRM 2706 (S.D. Calif. 1965).
A proviso to section 101 (a) (2) authorizes a labor organization "to adopt
and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member
toward the organization as an institution."
29. Lamb v. Carpenters Local 1292, 59 LRRM 2250 (E.D.N.Y. 1965).
30. See Musicians v. Wittstein, 379 U.S. 171 (1964).
31. King v. Randazzo, 346 F.2d 307, 59 LRRM 2412 (2d Cir. 1965).
32. Denov v. Davis, 61 LRRM 2203 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
33. Jennette v. Ammo11s, 60 LRRM 2154 (M.D. Tenn. 1965).

LAN DR UM ·GRIFFIN-1965-1966

45

a "member may be required to exhaust reasonable hearing
procedures" within the union for a period not exceeding
four months. In Ryan v. IBEW 34 and Roberts v. NLRB, 35
two courts of appeals concluded the proviso does not authorize a union to discipline a member for suing or filing charges
without first pursuing internal remedies. The proviso was
apparently read as authorizing only a court or agency to
require exhaustion. An argument can obviously be made
that any restriction imposed by a private body on a person's
access to a public tribunal is contrary to public policy, and
should be prohibited. 36 For a number of reasons, however,
I am persuaded that Congress intended in Section 101 (a) (4)
merely a partial, not an absolute, prohibition.
First, the general prohibitory language of Section 101 (a)(4) is directed at a "labor organization." The most natural
interpretation of the exception contained in the proviso is
that it, too, applies to a "labor organization." The authorization for a requirement that members pursue internal
remedies for four months would thus be an authorization for
such a requirement to be imposed by unions.
Second, in reporting on the conference agreement, Senator
Kennedy as floor manager said flatly that the four month
limitation in the House bill also related "to restrictions imposed by unions rather than the rules of judicial administration or the action of Government agencies." 37
Third, during the passage of the bill, the maximum allowable exhaustion period was reduced from six months to four
to meet an objection by Senator Goldwater. Since Taft-

34. 62 LRRM 2339 (7th Cir. 1966), affirming 241 F. Supp. 489, 59 LRRM
2300 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
35. 350 F.2d 427, 59 LRRM 2801 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (fine for filing charges
with NLRB without exhausting internal remedies an unfair labor practice).
36. See Cox, supra note I, at 839.
37. 105 Cong. Rec. 17899 (1959). Representative Griffin seems to have disputed Senator Kennedy's contention that the proviso would have no
effect at all on the traditional judicial doctrine of exhaustion of remedies.
See 105 Daily Cong. Rec. A7915 (Sept. 10, 1959). But he did not dem
that the proviso was applicable in any event to union-imposed restrictions.
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Hartley's "statute of limitations" is six months, the Senator
pointed out, a parallel six months exhaustion requirement
under Landrum-Griffin would place a union member in a
dilemma. If he pursued intra-union relief for six months,
the NLRB would refuse to process any subsequent unfair
labor practice charge. If he filed before six months to escape
the Taft-Hartley time bar, the union "may discipline him
for having filed the charge." 38 The Goldwater complaint
and the Congressional response to it make no sense except
on the hypothesis that the proviso permits union discipline
of members not pursuing intra-union remedies for four
months. Although the proviso explicitly authorizes an exhaustion requirement before initiation of "administrative
proceedings" as well as court actions, the NLRB, unlike the
courts, has never applied an exhaustion of remedies doctrine
and the proviso's four (or six) months limitation was not
intended to inhibit action by the NLRB. 39 Therefore, only
union rules, not agency rules, could have been the target of
the proviso battle.
Fourth, to construe the four-months proviso as regulating
agency conduct rather than union conduct leads logically to
the incongruous result that the NLRB would have to defer
to intra-union procedures for four months before it could
process charges. 40 As previously indicated, this has never
been the law.
Fifth, union discipline for failure to exhaust internal
remedies before seeking legal relief has long been an ac38. 105 Cong. Rec. 10095 (1959). See also 105 Cong. Rec. 14344-45 (1959)
(Reps. Landrum and Griffin) .
39. See 105 Cong. Rec. 17899 (1959) (Sen. Kennedy); 105 Cong. Rec. 15835
(1959) (Rep. McCormack); 105 Daily Cong. Rec. A7915 (Sept. 10, 1959)
(Rep. Griffin) .
40. In Roberts v. NLRB, supra 350 F.2d at 430, the court came close to
espousing this view. Cf. Cox, supra note 1, at 840.
I have considered the possibility the proviso allows a union to establish an exhaustion requirement, but allows only a court or agency to
implement it (by declining jurisdiction) . Such a separation of the rulemaking and rule-enforcing functions, however, seems sufficiently anomalous to be discounted, in the absence of a much clearer indication that it
was the congressional intent. Cf. Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 99 (1963).

LANDRUM-GRIFFIN-1965-1966

47

cepted practice in the labor movement. 41 While this of course
is not controlling, it suggests how the custom of resolving
disputes within the confines of an organization could be considered as possessing enough claim to legitimacy to justify
retention of the exhaustion requirement in a modified form.
For me, the force of those arguments, especially their
cumulative force, has never been satisfactorily countered.
The courts, it seems, have simply extended a policy beyond
the point where Congress deliberately stopped.
Exhaustion of internal remedies has been dispensed with
as a prerequisite to suit where union disciplinary action was
"void" because based on an offense not specified in the union
constitution, 42 or where exhaustion was deemed "futile" because of union hostility toward the member. 43 Appellate
relief must be pursued if there is no showing of prejudice,
however, or else the court will decline jurisdiction. 44

Disciplinary Proceedings
In assessing the fairness of union disciplinary proceedings
under Section 101 (a) (5), the courts are rightly less concerned with form than with substance. Informality or minor
departures from prescribed procedures are not fatal defects
as long as there is adequate notice of charges and a full opportunity to be heard. 45 As just mentioned, discipline to be
valid must be grounded in an offense listed in the organiza41. Sixty-four international constitutions make failure to exhaust a punishable offense. U.S. Dept. Labor, Bur. Lab. Stat. Bull. No. 1350, Disciplinary Powers and Procedures in Union Constitutions 28 (1963). In
Musicians v. Wittstein, 379 U.S. 171, 178, n. 6 (1964), the Court expressly relied on the established practices of a substantial body of American unions in determining what was allowable under rather ambiguous
statutory language.
42. Simmons v. Textile Workers Local 713, 350 F.2d 1012, 60 LRRM 2131
(4th Cir. 1965).
43. Farowitz v. Musicians Local 802, 241 F. Supp. 895, 59 LRRM 2749
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
44. Hopkins v. Daley, 59 LRRM 2622 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
45. Null v. Carpenters Dist. Council of Houston, 239 F. Supp. 809, 59 LRRM
2645 (S.D. Tex. 1965); Anderson v. Carpenters, 59 LRRM 2684 (D.
Minn. 1965).
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tion's constitution. 46 Furthermore, charges must be drafted
with reasonable particularity as to time, place, and circumstances.47 Fighting city hall is always a ticklish matter but
there is no deprivation of a fair hearing merely because the
accusers are business agents. 48
Remedies

Most courts hold punitive damages are not to be awarded
in Landrum-Griffin actions. 49 My feelings is that this is
sound. Giving "smart money" in a labor context just seems
out of place, at least in the ordinary case. There is something
of a conflict regarding damages for mental anguish. They
have been allowed in conjunction with damages for injured
reputation 50 and disallowed when standing alone. 51 Title I,
by the way, has been held to permit a damage action only
against a union or union officers acting in their official
capacity and not against members or officers acting as private
individuals. 52

TITLE IV
Election Standards

During the past year, for the first time, a significant number of court rulings on the "reasonableness" of union election
qualifications and procedures issued in a series of actions
46. Simmons v. Textile Workers Local 713, supra.
47. Jacques v. ILA Local 1418, 246 F. Supp. 857, 60 LRRM 2320 (E.D. La.
1965).
48. Cornelio v. Carpenters, 243 F. Supp. 126, 59 LRRM 2722 (E.D. Pa. 1965),
af!'d 61 LRRM 2688 (3d Cir. 1966).
19. Keenan v. Carpenters Dist. Council of Philadelphia, 59 LRRM 2510
(E.D. Pa. 1965); Magelssen v. Plasterers Local 518, 240 F. Supp. 259,
59 LRRM 2725 (W.D. Mo. 1965). Contra, Farowitz v. Musicians Local
802, 241 F. Supp. 895, 59 LRRM 2749 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
50. Simmons v. Textile Workers Local 713, 350 F.2d 1012, 60 LRRM 2131
(4th Cir. 1965).
51. Boilermakers v. Rafferty, 348 F.2d 307, 59 LRRM 2821 (9th Cir. 1965).
52. Keenan v. Carpenters Di5trict Council of Philadelphia, supra note 49.

LANDRUM-GRIFFIN-1965-1966

49

brought by the Secretary of Labor under Title IV. A variety
of conditions on eligibility for union office were found unreasonable and invalid, at least where they had the effect in
actual operation of disqualifying a substantial portion of a
union's membership. These included: (1) a requirement
that quarterly dues be paid in advance, on or before the first
day of each quarter, during the entire year preceding the
election; 53 (2) a requirement that a declaration of candidacy be filed four months prior to the nominating meeting;54 (3) a requirement of attendance at 75 percent of the
union's meetings during the two-year period since the last
election; 55 (4) a requirement of membership on the union's
board of directors for at least six months; 56 and (5) a requirement that a member prove his eligibility for an officer's bond
of the type prescribed by Section 502 of the Landrum-Griffin
Act. 57
Some of these qualifications may be interpreted either as
efforts to ensure that candidates will be well-versed and active
in a union's affairs or as efforts to deter dissidents and benefit
incumbents. Since Section 401 (e) guarantees "every member in good standing" the right to be a candidate, subject to
"reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed," a court is
probably on sound legal (as well as practical) grounds in
appraising most restrictions with a skeptical eye, demanding
a demonstrably good reason before allowing any limitation
to qualify as "reasonable" and thereby erode the "prima
facie" right of "every member" to run for office. 58 At any
53. Wirtz v. Operating Eng'rs Local 9, 58 LRRM 2550 (D. Colo. 1965)
(87% of membership ineligible) .
54. Wirtz v. Operating Eng'rs Local 30, 242 F. Supp. 631, 59 LRRM 2654
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
55. Wirtz v. Glass Bottle Blowers Local 153, 244 F. Supp. 745, 60 LRRM 2020
(W.D. Pa. 1965) (only 2.2% of membership eligible).
56. Wirtz v. Office Employees, 60 LRRM 2215 (N.D. Ind. 1965).
57. Wirtz v. Carpenters Local 559, 61 LRRM 2618 (W.D. Ky. 1966).
58. I would exempt from my strictures such traditional requirements as
completion of a minimum period of membership, or graduation from
apprentice to journeyman status. Cf. 29 C.F.R. §§ 452.7 (b), 452.10 (a)
(1965). And special circumstances, naturally, may call for special
qualifications.
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rate, it is in areas like this where terms like "reasonable" and
"fair" must be applied, that the courts are plainly entitled to
exercise the widest range of discretion.
Under Section 402 (c), an election is to be set aside if a
statutory violation "may have affected the outcome." Some
courts have reached the rather startling conclusion that the
disqualification of a candidate does not necessarily mean the
outcome of an election may have been affected. 59 Sound
policy suggests that certain violations, such as disqualification
of a candidate or failure to provide a secret ballot, should be
deemed per se to be violations that may have affected the
election's result. 60 To argue that a given candidate in a given
election has no earthly chance of winning (but who can
tell?) is beside the mark. Election campaigns serve a valuable
educational function, apart from anything else; opposition
must start somewhere, and it needs a rallying point; and the
notion that even a sure loser can be disqualified with impunity is offensive to the whole concept of a fair election.
Enforcement

Section 402 of the Landrum-Griffin Act provides for enforcement of its election safeguards, with minor exceptions,
through post-election suits by the Secretary of Labor in federal district court. The Secretary may act only in response
to a complaint filed with him by a member who has first
pursued any available intra-union remedies for three months.
In some respects the Labor Department's enforcement of
Title IV may be too zealous and in other respects too lax.
59. Wirtz v. Operating Eng'rs Local 30, supra note 54; Wirtz v. Operating
Eng'rs Local 410, 61 LRRM 2396 (N.D.N.Y. 1965). After this paper was
delivered, the district court's judgments were vacated as erroneous but the
complainants were ordered dismissed on the ground that intervening
union elections had rendered the cases moot. 62 LRRM 2777 (2d Cir.
1966) .
60. Wirtz v. Carpenters Local 559, supra note 57; Wirtz v. Office Employees,
supra note 56. Cf. Wirtz v. Hod Carriers Local 125, 62 LRRM 2141
(N.D. Ohio 1966) (allowing substantial number of persons to vote who
were ineligible because of nonpayment of dues may have affected outcome). See also Note, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1617, 1632 (1965).
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Although the Secretary may look upon himself as a roving
defender of a public right, Congress did not see it quite that
way. 61 Due regard for the Congressional goal of fostering
union self-regulation and meaningful recognition of the
statutory requirement of exhaustion of internal remedies
call for the Secretary to confine his election challenges, in
general, to matters previously covered in the member's protest to the union. It therefore seems out of order for the
Secretary to try to set aside an election on a ground which
the union has never had the chance to pass upon 62 or to try
to set aside the elections of all officers in a union when only
one office has been the subject of a member's grievance. 63
The district courts are divided on this question. 64 I would
agree, of course, that a member should not be bound by the
niceties of legal pleading in preparing his complaint to the
union or to the Secretary. 65
Contrasting with this diligence in ferreting out grounds on
which to contest elections is an apparent lack of vigor by the
Labor Department in the actual prosecution of suits. Now,
61. See S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st sess. 21 (1959): "In filing a
complaint the member must show that he has pursued any remedies
available to him within the union and any parent body in a timely
manner. This rule preserves a maximum amount of independence and
self-government by giving every international union the opportunity to
correct improper elections."
62. Wirtz v. Operating Eng'rs Local 406, 62 LRRM 2309 (E.D. La. 1966) .
(holding against Secretary) .
63. Wirtz v. Operating Eng'rs Local 9, supra note 53 (holding against
Secretary) .
64. For citations, see Wirtz v. Operating Eng'rs Local 406, supra note 62.
For a good defense of the Secretary's position, see Beaird, "Union Officer
Election Provisions of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959," 51 Va. L. Rev. 1306, 1326-31 (1965).
No sound analogy can be drawn from cases holding the NLRB's General Counsel may include in his complaint allegations not contained in
the charge filed with him. Unlike the Landrum-Griffin Act, the National Labor Relations Act has no exhaustion of remedies requirement.
On a somewhat related procedural issue, it has been held that a member must comply with a union's reasonable time limits on election
protests in order to be entitled to file a complaint with the Secretary.
Wirtz v. Masters, Mates, and Pilots Great Lakes Dist. Local 47, 61 LRRM
2010 (N.D. Ohio 1965) (10 days reasonable).
65. Wirtz v. Hod Carriers Local 169, 246 F. Supp. 741, 60 LRRM 2540 (D.
Nev. 1965).
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armchair criticism like mine is easy; the able public servants
who administer this novel statute in a highly sensitive area
of labor relations, undoubtedly face operational problems I
know nothing about. Nevertheless, something is amiss when
delay in pressing suits to void elections forces the Secretary
to defend against a flurry of mootness motions by officers
whose two- or even three-year terms are expiring prior to
final court action. 66 The average time in court for a case is
about fifteen months. 67 This means the candidates who are
declared the winners by the union in a disputed election
which eventually is set aside may run the organization for
all or most of their terms before they are replaced by lawfully
elected officers. Surely that is a situation where there is
peculiar aptness in saying justice delayed is justice denied.
After an election has been conducted, the Secretary of
Labor has exclusive authority to challenge it. Individual
members may not sue or even intervene in a Title IV action
brought by the Secretary. 68 Section 403, however, also provides that "Existing rights and remedies to enforce the constitution and bylaws of a labor organization with respect to
elections prior to the conduct thereof shall not be affected
by the provisions of this title." Before an election, therefore,
a private action may be maintained to ensure compliance
with an organization's own electoral rules. Academic commentators have argued that the union constitution is to be
interpreted as a matter of federal substantive law in preelection suits. 69 The centripetal pull of federal law in the
labor field cannot be gainsaid. 70 Nonetheless, the courts to
date apparently have assumed that pre-election suits to enforce a union's constitution are governed by state substantive
66. See, e.g., Wirtz v. Carpenters Local 559, 60 LRRM 2522 (W.D. Ky. 1965);
Wirtz v. Operating Eng'rs Local 410, supra note 59; Wirtz v. Operating
Eng'rs Local 825, 60 LRRM 2092 (D. N.J. 1965). (The mootness motions
were denied.)
67. Note, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1617, 1633 (1965).
68. Wirtz v. Operating Eng'rs Local 825, supra note 66.
69. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 9, at 136-138; Note, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1617,
1630 (1965); Note, 74 Yale L. ]. 1282, 1293-94 (1965).
70. Cf. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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law. 71 While an opposing policy argument can be made, the
courts' reading appears more in accord with the Congressional design. 72

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
Let me finish off with a quick rundown of several other
noteworthy Landrum-Griffin developments of the past year.
Section 504
In United States v. Brown, 73 the Supreme Court held,
with four justices dissenting, that Section 504 of the Act,
which makes it a crime fo ra Communist Party member
to be an officer or employee of a union (other than a clerk
or custodian), is unconstitutional as a bill of attainder.
Although the Court made no reference to Section 504's
similar disqualification of persons convicted of any of various
enumerated criminal offenses, its emphasis on the evils of
proscribing persons simply on the basis of membership in a
"political group" suggests that Brown would not be dispositive of the constitutionality of the section's anti-convict ban.
Investigatory Authority

Perhaps the most persistent personal grievance of union
leaders against Landrum-Griffin is that random-but fullscale- investigations by the Labor Department into an
organization's books and records are conducted in the absence
of any complaint or suspicion of wrong-doing and constitute
71. Libutti v. DiBrizzi, 343 F.2d 460, 58 LRRM 2846 (2d Cir. 1965); Wittstein v. Musicians, 59 LRRM 2335 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); McArthy v. Machinists Lodge 9, 61 LRRM 2652 (E.D. Mo. 1966).
72. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st sess. 49, 104 (1959) ("under
State or local law"; "no Federal remedy" prior to election) ; 105 Daily
Cong. Rec. 5820 (April 22, 1959) (Sen. Kennedy: "Prior to the day of an
election an individual can sue in a State") . Cf. Cox, supra note 1, at
846: " ... section 403 preserves state remedies prior to an election."
73. 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
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an unnecessary source of inconvenience and embarrassment.
One knowledgeable union attorney of my acquaintance insists that Parkinson's Law is at work here. The Secretary's
investigative staff, not having enough genuine complaints to
look into, has got to do something to keep busy. While I have
a certain sympathy for any union official whose office is torn
apart for two or three weeks and who worries about the political capital his opponents may be able to wring from any
investigation, however routine, I cannot become very excited
about his predicament. Business had to get used to investigations under the Fair Labor Standards Act and taxpayers
have to put up with the agents of the Internal Revenue
Service. Susceptibility to government inquiry is an occupational hazard of important institutions in modern society.
In any event, the courts have continued to read broadly the
Secretary of Labor's investigatory powers under Section 601
of the Act. For example, a subpoena was sustained for the
purpose of investigating an alleged misuse of union funds in
violation of Section 501 (a) even though Section 501 is enforceable by private parties or the Attorney General and not
by the Secretary. 74 And, regardless of the allowable scope of
an action by the Secretary to invalidate an election, his investigation is not restricted to the matters complained about
by a member. 75
Bonds
Public Law 89-216, 76 approved and effective September 29,
1965, amended Section 502 of Landrum-Griffin to authorize
union personnel handling organizational funds to be covered
by a standard "honesty" bond rather than by the more expensive "faithful performance of financial duties" bond formerly
required. The amendment also permits the use of a wider
range of surety companies.
74. Teamsters v. Wirtz, 346 F.2d 827, 59 LRRM 2081 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
75. Operating Eng'rs Local 57 v. Wirtz, 346 F.2d 552, 59 LRRM 2310 (1st
Cir. 1965).
76. 79 Stat. 888 (1965), amending 29 U.S.C. § 502.
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Reporting

The Fourth Circuit has held that any attorney who undertakes for an employer to persuade employees how to exercise
their right of self-organization becomes subject to a broad
reporting obligation under the Act. He must disclose to the
Secretary of Labor his receipts and expenditures and the
names of his clients in connection with all his labor relations
advice or services. 77

CONCLUSION
Proper administration of the Landrum-Griffin Act by the
Secretary of Labor and the courts requires, in my view, the
judicious ordering of a whole hierarchy of democratic values.
Certainly, union democracy is a worthy value and entitled
to much weight. But I should think it a sorry issue of this
venture in mandatory democracy if a single-minded pursuit
of that objective were to blind the Act's administrators to
the competing right of a union to regulate its own affairs or
to the overriding right of Congress to determine where union
autonomy ends and federal controls take over.
77. Douglas v. Wirtz, 353 F.2d 30, 60 LRRM 2264 (4th Cir. 1965).

